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1Abstract
We consider extensive-form games in which the information structure is not known
and ask how much of that structure can be inferred from the distribution on action
proﬁles generated by player strategies. One game is said to observationally imitate
another when the distribution on action proﬁles generated by every behavior strategy
in the latter can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behavior strategy
in the former. The ﬁrst part of the paper develops analytical methods for testing
observational imitation. The central idea is to relate a game’s information structure
to the conditional independencies in the distributions it generates on action proﬁles.
We present a new analytical device, the inﬂuence opportunity diagram of a game,
describe how such a diagram is constructed for a given ﬁnite-length extensive-form
game, and demonstrate that it provides, for a large class of economically interesting
games, a simple test for observational imitation. The second part of the paper shifts
the focus to the inﬂuence assessments of players within a game. A new equilibrium
concept, causal Nash equilibrium, is presented and compared to several other well-
known alternatives. Cases in which causal Nash equilibrium seems especially well-
suited are explored.
Keywords: causality, information structure, extensive form game, observational im-
itation, Bayesian network
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper focuses on the question of what can be said about situations in which
the information structure of a ﬁnite-length extensive-form game is not known. There
are two cases in which the answer to this question matters. The ﬁrst is when an
individual outside the game, say a social scientist, would like to infer something about
the information structure of the game from the observed behavior of its participants.
The second is when individuals in a game are unsure of the information upon which
their opponents condition their decisions. In this latter case, beliefs about causal
structure — who inﬂuences whom — should play an important role in determining
equilibrium behavior.
We explore both cases and, speciﬁcally, analyze what can be inferred about a
game’s information structure solely from the probability distribution on action pro-
ﬁles induced by actual player strategies (which we refer to as the “empirical distri-
bution of play”). The main idea is to connect a game’s information structure, which
identiﬁes the individual histories upon which players condition their behavior, to the
corresponding set of conditional independencies that must be observed in all of its
empirical distributions. When two games with diﬀerent information structures imply
diﬀerent sets of such independencies, then knowledge of the empirical distribution
provides a basis upon which to distinguish one from the other.
The ﬁrst part of the paper considers information structure assessment from the
perspective of an outsider who only observes player behavior (actions, not strategies).
To this end, we introduce the notion of observational imitation. One game is said
to observationally imitate another when the empirical distribution induced by any
behavior strategy proﬁle in the latter can also be induced by an appropriately chosen
behavior strategy proﬁle in the former. Thus, even under inﬁnite repetition, it is
impossible to distinguish a game from its imitators solely on the basis of the observed
behavior of its players.
Our analysis is facilitated by the introduction of a new graphical device, the
3inﬂuence opportunity diagram of a game (hereafter, IOD). The IOD is deﬁned con-
structively for a broad class of ﬁnite-length extensive-form games, including those
with inﬁnite action sets. As we show, the IOD summarizes certain information about
the conditional independencies that must be observed in all empirical distributions
arising from play of the underlying game. This feature allows us to apply some re-
sults from the extensive literature on probabilistic networks in artiﬁcial intelligence
to address the issues raised above. This literature explores the use of graphs to model
uncertainty and decisions in complex domains. Since most economists are not famil-
iar with it, we have included a condensed, self-contained discussion of the relevant
results and references in Appendix A.
Ab a s i cﬁnding is that a necessary requirement for one game to imitate another
is that their IODs imply a consistent set of conditional independencies. This require-
ment is not, in general, suﬃcient because diﬀerences in the speciﬁc information upon
which players condition their behavior may imply additional restrictions on empirical
distributions that are not picked up by the IOD. However, we do identify a broad
class of games, termed games of exact information, for which this condition is also
suﬃcient. For games of this type, we use results from the literature on probabilistic
networks and develop new ones to show that observational imitation can be identiﬁed
by simple visual comparison of the IODs of the games in question.
The second part of the paper shifts the focus to inﬂuence assessment from the
inside — that is, to games in which the players themselves are uncertain about the
information structure governing their play. If equilibrium is interpreted as the out-
come of some generic learning process (as is typical in the literature on learning in
noncooperative games), then a player’s equilibrium beliefs regarding the underlying
inﬂuence relationships should be consistent with observed behavior. This idea leads
to a new equilibrium notion, that of a causal Nash equilibrium, which imposes such
consistency on player beliefs. We demonstrate the relationship between causal Nash
equilibrium and other well-known equilibrium concepts.
4An obvious question is whether this new equilibrium concept holds useful impli-
cations for situations of genuine economic interest. We can think of at least two
cases in which it does. The ﬁrst and, perhaps most obvious, is when payoﬀs are sys-
tematically related to information structure. In such situations, reﬁning beliefs with
respect to the true information structure may well lead to a better assessment of the
payoﬀs faced both by oneself and one’s opponents. The second case, which to our
knowledge has previously received no explicit attention, is when a player (or players)
must choose an appropriate ‘intervention’ in the activities of one or more of their op-
ponents. A player is said to have intervention ability when his or her choice of action
determines, non-trivially, the feasible actions available to others.1 Here, an accurate
assessment of the game’s inﬂuence relationships may be crucial to the success of the
interventionist. We term these intervention games and present an example of causal
Nash equilibrium applied to such a game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
several simple examples designed to illustrate the notion of observational imitation.
Section 3 lays out the deﬁnition of a ﬁnite-length extensive-form game (which diﬀers in
some ways from the usual setup) and deﬁnes observational imitation and observational
indistinguishability. In Section 4, we present our main results regarding the analysis
of observational imitation (from the perspective of an outside observer). Section 4.1
shows how to construct an IOD from an extensive-form game. Section 4.2 connects
information structure to observational imitation through the IOD. Section 4.3 shows
how to test whether one game observationally imitates another by visual inspection
of their respective IODs. Section 5 shifts the focus to inﬂuence uncertainty within
the game. First, we give a motivating example in which uncertainty about who
takes the role of Stackleberg leader may cause potential entrants to stay out of a
market. Section 5.2 introduces our deﬁnition of causal Nash equilibrium and makes
formal comparisons to several well-known equilibrium concepts. Section 5.3 presents
an extended example of causal Nash equilibrium applied to an intervention game.
5We conclude in Section 6 with a more thorough discussion of related research and
potential extensions.
2 Examples and Intuition
Consider the game trees presented in Figures 1 through 3. The ﬁrst, ΓA, has the
familiar structure of a standard “signalling” game. The other two are variations
involving the same players who have the same feasible actions at the time of their
moves. We wish to show that ΓA and ΓB a r ei na ne q u i v a l e n c ec l a s si nt h es e n s e
that any distribution on action proﬁles generated by (behavioral) strategies in one
can also be generated by an appropriate choice of strategies in the other. ΓC, on the
other hand, is not a member of this class.
Let A ≡ {(u,L,U),...,(d,R,D)} be the set of possible action proﬁles in each
of the three games (up to a permutation of the components). We refer to a single












strategy proﬁle in Γk where θ
k
i is the strategy chosen by player i in game k. Every
behavior strategy in each of the three games implies a probability distribution mθk
on A constructed as follows, for all a ∈ A,





















Now, suppose ΓA is repeated a large number of times under a ﬁxed strategy
proﬁle θ
A. Assume the outcomes are recorded and reported to an outside observer
who knows that one of ΓA, ΓB,o rΓC is the game responsible for generating the data
(but not which). The question we wish to answer is whether there are any strategies
θ
A that would allow the outsider to correctly identify ΓA as the underlying game.
First, note that the construction of mθA immediately implies that, for all a ∈ A,
6the following factorization holds
mθA (a)=mθA (aII|aI)mθA (aI|aN)mθA (aN).
Of course, mθB and mθC can be factored analogously. By the deﬁnition of conditional
probability, for every θ
A,













= mθA (aN|aI)mθA (aI|aII)mθA (aII).
This is signiﬁcant because it implies that for every behavior strategy in ΓA, one can
ﬁnd a corresponding strategy in ΓB that generates exactly the same distribution on A;
given θ
A, simply construct θ
B such that, for all a ∈ A, θ
B
N (aN|aI) ≡ mθA (aN|aI),
and so on. Then, mθA = mθB. Therefore, the outside observer — even with very
exact information about the true distribution on outcomes implied by some behavior
strategy — can never distinguish between ΓA and ΓB.
On the other hand, it should be clear that ΓC cannot imitate all strategies from ΓA
and ΓB. Barring correlated strategies without an explicit correlating device, there are
many strategy proﬁles in ΓA (and, therefore, in ΓB as well) that generate distributions
over action proﬁles that could not possibly correspond to any strategy proﬁle in ΓC.
For example, any θ
A in which player I conditions her behavior on Nature’s play
results in a mθA that cannot be duplicated by an appropriate choice of strategy in
ΓC.
3 The model
Wherever possible, capital letters (X,Z) denote sets, small letters (a,w) either ele-
ments of sets or functions, and script letters (A,F) collections of sets. Sets whose
7members are ordered proﬁles are indicated by bold capitals (A,E) with small bold
(a,e) denoting typical elements. Graphs and probability spaces play a large role
in the following analysis. Standard notation and deﬁnitions are adopted wherever
possible.
3.1 Extensive-form games
We begin with a ﬁnite-length, extensive-form game of perfect recall. The game Γ has
a game tree (X,E)w i t hn o d e sX and edges E. Players are indexed by N ≡ {1,...,n}
with n<∞. The terminal nodes are Z ⊂ X with typical element z.P a y o ﬀsa r eg i v e n
by u : Z → Rn. Attention is restricted to games in which inﬂuence opportunities
between players are ﬁxed.2 Speciﬁcally, assume that all paths are of length t<∞
and that the player-move order is summarized by an onto function o : T → N where
T ≡ {1,...,t} and i = o(r)m e a n st h a ti is the player who (always) has the rth move.3
Every (xr,x r+1) ∈ E corresponds to an action available at xr.L e tXr denote the
set of all nodes associated with the rth move. For all r ∈ T, let Ar be the union
of the actions available at the nodes in Xr. E d g e sa r el a b e l e di ns u c haw a yt h a t
every history is unique. In particular, every z ∈ Z corresponds to a unique action
proﬁle az =( a1z,...,atz). The set of all action proﬁles is A ≡∪ z∈Zaz. Each Ar comes
equipped with a σ-algebra Ar.T h eσ-algebra for A is A ≡ σ ({F ∈ ×r∈TAr|F ⊂ A}).
Assume all measure spaces are standard.4 We call (A,A)t h eoutcome space.T h i s ,
coupled with an appropriate probability measure, is the focal object of our analysis.
Let az 7→ v (az) ≡ u(z) translate payoﬀso nZ to payoﬀso nA.
For r ∈ T, the (complete) history at r is an A-measurable function a 7→ ˜ hr (a) ≡
(a1,...,ar−1). We use hr to denote a typical element of ˜ hr (A) and deﬁne ˜ h1 to
be a constant equal to the null history h0. For every move r, there is a bijective
relationship between ˜ hr (A), the set of all (r − 1)-length action proﬁles, and Xr.I n
general, players do not know the full proﬁle of actions leading up to their move. To
reﬂect this, Xr is partitioned into a collection of subsets called the move-r information
8partition and whose elements are called move-r information sets. Given the bijective
relationship between Z and A (and the fact that every path in the tree contains
exactly one node in Xr), the move-r information partition implies a corresponding
partition of A whose elements, we assume, are A-measurable. Deﬁne the information






Typically, not all of Ar is available to player o(r) given a particular history hr. The
feasible actions at r are given by the Ir-measurable move-r feasible action constraint
˜ cr : A → Ar. Assume that feasible action sets are equal for all nodes in the same




or ˜ cr (hr) without ambiguity.
Let ∆(X,X) denote the set of probability measures on a measure space (X,X);
when X is countable, we simply write ∆(X) where it is to be understood that X =2 X.
Traditionally, a behavior strategy at a move is a function from the information sets at
that move to probability measures on the player’s feasible actions. Equivalently, we
implement this idea by deﬁning a behavior strategy at move-r to be an Ir-measurable




is the probability that player o(r)
t a k e sa na c t i o ni nF ∈ Ar given her arrival at the node corresponding to ˜ hr (a). The
measurability requirement achieves the eﬀect of making θr constant on all histories




is restricted to assign positive




.P l a y e ri’s behavior strategy is
deﬁned as the proﬁle θi ≡ (θr)r∈o−1(i). Σi is the set of all behavior strategies available
to i.Astrategy proﬁle is an element θ ∈ Σ ≡ ×i∈NΣi. When convenient, we use the
familiar shorthand θ =( θi,θ−i).
3.2 Empirical distribution
Given a game meeting the conditions of the previous section, every behavior strategy
proﬁle θ induces a probability space, denoted (A,A,m θ). The measure mθ can be







IF (a)θt (dat|a1,...,a t−1)···θ2 (da2|a1)θ1 (da1), (1)
where
R
indicates Lebesgue integration and IF is the indicator function for F. We
call mθ the empirical distribution induced by θ. For all r ∈ T, deﬁne ˜ ar : A → Ar so














denotes the mθ-conditional probability of ˜ a−1


















is equal to mθ (˜ ar|Ir). This, combined with (1)




mθ (˜ ar|Ir), (3)












Equation (3) says that the information structure of an extensive-form game implies
certain conditional independencies in every empirical distribution that can arise as a
result of play. Alternatively, given an arbitrary mθ, is it possible to use the relation-
ship in (3) to deduce the information structure of the underlying game? The answer
is: yes, up to an equivalence class of games as described in the next section.
3.3 Observational imitation and indistinguishability
Ag a m eΓ0 is said to observationally imitate Γ when the empirical distribution induced
by any strategy proﬁle in Γ can also be induced by an appropriately chosen strategy
proﬁle in Γ0. Consider a situation in which the data generated by a game is cross-
sectional; i.e., an outcome is a listing of the speciﬁc actions taken by each player
without reference to the timing of the moves. Then, an individual observing outcomes
10generated by repeated play of θ in Γ, eventually, develops a fairly precise estimate
of mθ. However, when Γ0 observationally imitates Γ, then there is no collection of
Γ-generated data capable of ruling out Γ0 as the true underlying game.
An obvious necessary condition for observational imitation is that the games have
consistent player sets and outcome proﬁles. Given a permutation f : T → T,let f (a)




r∈T and, for F ⊆ A, let f (F)b et h es e tw h o s e
elements are the permuted elements of F. Then, Γ0 is outcome compatible with Γ if and
only if: (1) N = N0; (2) there exists a permutation f such that f (A)=A0; (3) for all
r ∈ T, o(r)=o0 (f (r)); and, (4) for all r ∈ T, Ar = A0
f(r).L e tOΓ denote the class
of games that are outcome compatible with Γ.N o t et h a tΓ0 ∈ OΓ implies Γ ∈ OΓ0.
If Γ0 ∈ OΓ, then there may exist a θ
0∈ Σ
0 that induces an empirical distribution on
(A,A); i.e., constructed as in (1) but using the appropriate permutation. When this
is the case, we write mθ0 without ambiguity.
Deﬁnition 1 Γ0 observationally imitates Γ, denoted Γ ¹ Γ0,i fΓ0 ∈ OΓ and there
exists a function g : Σ → Σ0 such that ∀θ ∈ Σ,m θ = mg(θ).
If both Γ ¹ Γ0 and Γ0 ¹ Γ, then Γ and Γ0 are said to be observationally indistin-
guishable, denoted Γ ∼ Γ0. The interpretation is that when Γ0 and Γ are indistinguish-
able, any behavior observed under Γ (“observed” in the sense of knowing mθ)c o u l d
also be observed under Γ0 and vice versa. When Γ ∼ Γ0, Γ diﬀers from Γ0 in terms
of its information and, possibly, payoﬀ structures. Note that observational imitation
is strong in the sense that the condition must hold for all θ ∈ Σ. Alternatively, for
example, one might be interested in a notion of observational imitation deﬁned only
for speciﬁc (e.g., equilibrium) proﬁles. Hereafter, we drop the “observationally” and
simply say that one game imitates another or that two games are indistinguishable.
Lemma 1 Indistinguishability is an equivalence relation on the space of ﬁnite-length
extensive form games.
11To help ﬁx ideas, let us revisit the examples in Section 2. Starting with ΓA,f o r
all θ








Let Aai ⊂ A be the event in A corresponding to player i playing action ai; e.g.,






















N = {∅,A}, IA
I = {∅,AU,AD,A} and IA
II = {∅,AL,AR,A}.
Clearly, ΓB ∈ OΓA. Moreover, as we saw in the example, for any θ
A ∈ ΣA, there
corresponds a θ








Therefore, ΓA ¹ ΓB. Since this works in both directions, it is also true that ΓB ¹ ΓA,
thereby implying ΓA ∼ ΓB.
4 Assessing imitation between games
In this section we analyze imitation from the perspective of an outside observer who
knows the empirical distribution generated by an arbitrary behavior strategy proﬁle
in a game with unknown information structure. To what extent does this knowledge
illuminate the game’s underlying information structure? To check a candidate game,
one might attempt the same “brute-force” approach used in the motivating examples.
In simple cases, the analysis is relatively straightforward. On the other hand, consider
t h eg a m ei nF i g u r e4 . H e r e ,ﬁve players interact under a relatively complex infor-
mation structure. The implications of this structure for the empirical distributions
on actions arising from player strategies are not obvious. We now develop results by
which these implications are neatly analyzed.
124.1 Inﬂuence opportunity diagrams
Loosely, player o(r) is said to have the opportunity to inﬂuence play at move s if
he has a choice of feasible actions available under some conceivable play of the game
that permits player o(s)t oa l t e rh e rb e h a v i o rr e g a r d l e s so fw h a th e ro t h e ro p p o n e n t s
do (i.e., opponents other than o(r)). The following deﬁnition formalizes this idea.
Deﬁnition 2 The inﬂuence opportunity diagram of Γ is a graph (T,→) such that
r → s if and only if r<s ,and there exist a,a0 ∈ A satisfying each of the following
conditions: (1) ˜ hr (a)=˜ hr (a0); (2) ∃F ∈Is such that ˜ h
−1
r+1 (a1,...,ar) ⊂ F and a0 ∈
Fc; (3) a0
s 6= as;a n d ,(4) ˜ aj(a0)j∈{k|k>r,k→s} =˜ aj(a)j∈{k|k>r,k→s}.
The meat of the deﬁnition is that r → s when there is some move-r history (item
1) at which player o(r) has a choice of actions that cause play at s to be at diﬀerent
information sets (item 2) and to which player o(s) can respond diﬀerently (item
3). Note that item 2 implies that there are at least two distinct actions available
at r, one that guarantees the occurrence of F and another that is necessary for the
occurrence of Fc (but may not guarantee it). Inﬂuence is only an “opportunity”
since this condition is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for move r actions to have an
actual eﬀect on move s behavior. For example, the player at move s may choose to
ignore the action taken at move r (e.g., when θs is constant on A). Alternatively,
t h ep l a y e ra tm o v er may inﬂuence play at move s indirectly through other players
(e.g., when r → q → s even though r 9 s). Item 4 is a technical condition that
rules out spurious inﬂuence due to feasible action restrictions that force the move
at s to be independent of actions taken at r given actions taken at some subset of
moves following r. Although spurious inﬂuence due to game structure is a technical
possibility, it does not arise in any games of economic interest with which we are
familiar.
Return to game ΓA in Figure 1. Here, player I observes player N and player
II observes player I, which suggests the IOD should be N → I and I → II. To
13see that this is correct, ﬁrst check N → I. In this case, II = {∅,FU,FD,A} where
FU ≡ {a1,a2,a5,a6}. Then, (a5,a4) establish the result: (1) ˜ hN (a5)=˜ hN (a8)=h0,
(2) ˜ h
−1
I (h0,U)={a1,a2,a5,a6} = FU and a4 ∈ Fc = FD,a n d( 3 )˜ aI (a5)=( R) 6=
˜ aI (a4)=( L). Item (4) is automatically satisﬁed since there are no moves between
I and II. Similarly, I → II is established by (a1,a6). However, N 9 II since the
smallest III-measurable event containing either ˜ h
−1
N (U)o r˜ h
−1
N (D)i sA.6
By identical reasoning, the IOD for the game in Figure 3 is N ← I ← II.The IOD
for Figure 2 is a graph with three nodes and no edges. The IOD for the Gatekeeper






Player 3 is the “gatekeeper” of information ﬂo w i n gf r o mp l a y e r s1a n d2t op l a y e r s4
and 5.
To understand item (4) of the deﬁnition, consider Game I in Figure 5. Notice that
this game has the unusual feature that player 2’s feasible action sets are diﬀerent at
every information set. Without item (4), the IOD would be 1 → 2, 2 → 3a n d1→ 3.
However, by condition (4), 1 → 3 is removed. Intuitively, the game’s structure implies
that knowing the action chosen by 1 is always irrelevant in assessing 3’s behavior when
the action taken by 2 is already known. If the feasible actions at information set 2b
are {U,D}, as in Game II, then the IOD is 1 → 2, 2 → 3 and 1 → 3.
We now demonstrate that the IOD summarizes certain conditional independen-
cies that must arise in every empirical distribution of play.7 Given (T,→), the set of
moves at which players may exert a direct inﬂuence upon player o(r)a tm o v er is





tion of a into the dimensions indexed by {s ∈ T|s → r}.I f{s ∈ T|s → r} = ∅, let ˜ πr
14be an arbitrary constant (in which case, σ (˜ πr)={∅,A}).
Proposition 1 Given a game Γ with IOD (T,→),
∀θ ∈ Σ,m θ =
Y
r∈T
mθ (˜ ar|˜ πr). (4)
4.2 Imitation and independence in probability
In the following sections we compare outcome compatible games. In order to reduce
the notational burden throughout the rest of the paper, when comparing two games
Γ and Γ0, Γ0 ∈ OΓ, we drop the reference to the permutation function f.T h u s ,
when comparing two games, the “rth move” refers to the same player and same set of
actions in both games, with the order in Γ as the point of reference. This convention
will apply to the IOD generated by Γ0 too, so that r →0 s in Γ0 means that — in Γ0 —
the agent who has the rth move in Γ has the potential to inﬂuence the agent who has
the sth move in Γ.8
If Γ ¹ Γ0, then equation (1) and the measurability restriction on behavior strate-
gies imply that Γ ¹ Γ0 if and only if Γ0 ∈OΓ and






(where, per our notational convention, I0
r ⊂ A corresponds to the information at move
f(r)i nΓ0). In other words, testing whether Γ0 imitates Γ is equivalent to checking
for outcome compatibility and then checking whether every empirical distribution
induced by a strategy in Γ can be factored according to the information algebras
implied by Γ0.
9 Since I0
r ⊆ σ(˜ π0
r), we have the following corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 If Γ ¹ Γ0 then
∀θ ∈ Σ,m θ =
Y
r∈T
mθ (˜ ar|˜ π
0
r). (6)
15To see why condition (6) is only necessary (i.e., as opposed to necessary and
suﬃcient when Γ0 ∈OΓ), consider the two games in Figure 6. Both have the same
IOD: I → II. Moreover Γ2∈OΓ1. Clearly, however, there are empirical distributions
that can arise in Γ1 but not in Γ2. Indeed, Γ2 ¹ Γ1 but Γ1 ± Γ2. The issue is the
measurability distinction between conditions (5) and (6). If I2
II is the information
algebra for II in Γ2, then there are behavior strategies for II in Γ1 that are not
I2






For certain types of games, Corollary 1 can be strengthened. Γ is said to be a
game of exact information if, for all r ∈ T, Ir = σ (˜ πr);ag a m eo fe x a c ti n f o r m a t i o n
is one in which a player observes the moves of those preceding her either perfectly
or not at all. This class contains many extensive-form games of economic interest:
all of the games in Section 2 meet this requirement as do many standard market
games such as Cournot, Stackleberg, etc. Note that games of perfect information are
games of exact information in which every player exactly observes the move of every
predecessor.
Proposition 2 Let Γ0 be a game of exact information. Then, Γ ¹ Γ0 if and only if
Γ0 ∈ OΓ and condition (6) hold.
4.3 Testing for imitation
Suppose, given a game Γ and another Γ0 of exact information, one wishes to determine
whether Γ ¹ Γ0. One might be tempted to use Proposition 2 for this purpose. How-
ever, this is not practical for complex games since condition (6) must be checked for
all strategy proﬁles. In this section, we develop results that permit this determination
by simple visual inspection of the games’ IODs.
For the following proposition, given an IOD (T,→), let E be the set of edges
without reference to direction; i.e., {i,j} ∈ E if and only if (i → j)o r( j → i). Let S ⊂
T 3 be the set of all ordered triples such that (i,j,k) ∈ S if and only if (i → j),(k → j)
and {i,k} / ∈ E.
16Proposition 3 Given two games Γ and Γ0 with Γ ∈ OΓ0 and Γ0 a game of exact
information, if (T,→) and (T,→0) are such that E = E0 and S = S0, then Γ ¹ Γ0.
Corollary 2 Assume Γ and Γ0 are both games of exact information with Γ ∈ OΓ0,
E = E0,a n dS = S
0. Then, Γ ∼ Γ0.
To see how these results are used, consider once again games ΓA and ΓB in Section
2. These are both games of exact information. The IODs are N → I → II and
N ← I ← II, respectively. By Corollary 2, it is virtually immediate that these
games are indistinguishable: EA = EB = {{N,I},{I,II}} and SA= S
B = ∅. Recall






Since this is a game of exact information, Corollary 2 tells us that there are no other
IODs from which it is indistinguishable. An indistinguishable game requires an IOD
with the same set of edges, some with diﬀerent directions. However, reversing any
arrow above either breaks a converging pair of arrows or creates a new one.10
The requirement that elements of S not include convergent arrows with adjacent
tails (i.e., (i,j,k) ∈ S ⇒{i,k} / ∈ E) has an implication for three-move games that
should be kept in mind when reviewing the examples in Sections 5.1 and 5.3 below.
Namely, all exact information, outcome compatible games whose IODs are a variation





We want to extend Proposition 3 to allow us to establish imitation more generally.
One approach is to use the “d-separation” criterion for graphs deﬁned by Pearl (1986);
see the discussion in Appendix A and Proposition 7 in Appendix B. Here, we show
that a very simple graph operation, edge deletion, together with the concepts just
used in Proposition 3, suﬃce to determine imitability more generally. Let rem(T,→)
be the set of IODs obtained from (T,→) by the operation of edge deletion, and let
eq(T,→) be the set of IODs that satisfy the second condition of Proposition 3; i.e.,
(T,→0) ∈ eq(T,→) if and only if E = E0 and S = S0.
Proposition 4 Assume Γ ∈ OΓ0 and Γ0 is a game of exact information. If (T,→) ∈
rem(T,→∗) for some (T,→∗) ∈ eq(T,→0) then Γ ¹ Γ0.
That is, when comparing two compatible games, Γ and Γ0, the latter of exact
information, Γ ¹ Γ0 if the IOD of Γ can be obtained by edge deletion from any IOD
(T,→∗)i nw h i c hE∗ = E0 and S∗ = S0. Finally, a much stronger result holds for
games of perfect information. Speciﬁcally, a game of perfect information imitates
every game with which it is outcome compatible.
Corollary 3 Let Γ0 be a game of perfect information. For every Γ ∈ OΓ0, Γ ¹ Γ0.I f
Γ is also a game of perfect information, Γ ∼ Γ0.
5I n ﬂuence from the player’s perspective
In this section, we consider the implications of observational imitation from the per-
spective of the players inside a game. There are at least two cases in which uncertainty
about a game’s information structure may have equilibrium implications. The ﬁrst
case is when payoﬀs are correlated with game structure. In such cases, knowledge
about the structure of the game may allow players to infer something about their own
type. We begin this section with a motivating example of this kind. We then present
18a new equilibrium notion, causal Nash equilibrium, for games in which uncertainty
about who inﬂuences whom is an important factor. Finally, we close with an example
of the second case, games in which the central interest is in the ability of one player
to intervene in the activities of others. In such situations, the interventionist’s beliefs
about his inﬂuence relationships may have important behavioral implications.
5.1 Causal uncertainty as a barrier to entry
Consider a situation in which a ﬁrm must decide whether or not to enter an industry.
Assume the potential entrant is a short-term player (i.e., will play for one period
only) which, upon entry, challenges a long-term incumbent in a market game of
quantity competition. Suppose the challenger is uncertain both about the information
structure and its own marginal cost. Imagine the challenger has in its possession cross-
sectional quantity data from a long sequence of interactions in which entry occurred
(by other short-term competitors). Assume that the data indicates a noisy process
with a strong negative correlation between the quantity choices of the incumbent and
those of its competitors. Demand parameters are known, but actual cost information
is not publicly available. Entrants share a common cost.
What should the challenger do? The correlated quantity choices suggest that
someone, either the entrant or the incumbent, takes the role of Stackleberg leader.
To make things concrete, suppose the game is parameterized as follows. The market
leader and follower have constant marginal costs of cl =2a n dcf = 1, respectively.
Inverse demand is given by P ≡ 7 − ql − qf where (ql,q f) ∈ R2
+ are the quantities
chosen by the two ﬁrms. Firm production processes are prone to random shocks with
actual output for ﬁrm k given by qa
k ≡ qk + εk where εk ∼ (0,σ2
k)i sa ni.i.d. random
noise term. The Nash equilibrium expected output is ¯ ql =2a n d¯ qf = 2. The expected
proﬁtf o rt h el e a d e ri s¯ vl = 2 and for the follower is ¯ vf =4 . Actual observations (i.e.,
the data available to the challenger) are generated by qa
l =2+εl and qa
f =2− 1
2εl+εf.






< 0. The challenger knows these parameters, but not
19the role to which it will be assigned upon entry.
Let Γ1 be the game in which the incumbent is the leader and Γ2 be the one in
which entrants lead. Assume once and for all that entrants are always Stackleberg
followers; i.e., the true game is Γ1. If the challenger enters, it pays a one-time entry
fee of 3. If it stays out, it receives a payoﬀ of zero. In this situation, the Nash
equilibrium of the game is for the challenger to enter with a net expected payoﬀ of 1.
The incumbent is assumed to know the truth and to play optimally in every period
(which is simply to play his part of the static Nash equilibrium in the market stage
game).
The problem with applying Nash here is highlighted by Corollary 2. The true stage
game has three moves and a fully connected IOD {(E1 → I),(I → E2),(E1 → E2)}
where E1 is the entrant’s decision to enter or not, and I and E2 are the incumbent’s
and the entrant’s quantity choices, respectively. As we discuss on page 17, since
Stackleberg is a game of exact information, this is indistinguishable from the stage
game in which the entrant is the leader. Speciﬁcally, suppose the challenger has initial
prior µ ∈ [0,1] that Γ1 is the true stage game. If µ ≥ 1
2, the subjectively rational
challenger enters, otherwise it does not. Notice that, if entry occurs, the challenger
learns the game is, indeed, Γ1 and, upon learning this, has no regrets about its
decision. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm stays out, it receives a payoﬀ of zero (as
expected) and no sequence of additional entry data generated by future challengers
will ever reveal its mistake.
One well-known solution concept that may seem appropriate in this situation is
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (hereafter, BNE). However, BNE requires players to have
common and correct priors which, in this context, implies either that all challengers
enter or all challengers stay out. Apparently, some solution concept other than Nash
or BNE is required for the outcome suggested by the preceding example. This is the
subject to which our analysis now turns.
205.2 Causal Nash equilibrium
In the spirit of the literature on game theoretic learning, we wish to develop an
equilibrium concept whose interpretation is consistent with situations like the one
described above. In equilibrium, players have beliefs about the game’s true inﬂuence
relationships, they choose strategies that are optimal with respect to these beliefs
and, as play unfolds, observe nothing that refutes them. Speciﬁcally, suppose players
in some game Γ are uncertain about the game’s information structure and payoﬀs;
that is, everyone knows they are playing some game in OΓ. Let ˆ µi denote player i’s
initial prior regarding which of the games in OΓ is the one actually being played.
For simplicity, assume that Λi ≡ support(ˆ µi)i sﬁnite. We do not require players to
have common priors, but we do impose a minimal amount of consistency with the
underlying game: for all i ∈ N, Γ ∈ Λi.
In this context, each player needs to know what she will do at any information set
that could be reached in any of the games she believes she might be playing. Recall
that the information sets at a move in Γ correspond to a partition of A. Therefore,
for all Γk ∈ Λi, let Ck
r ∈ A denote the partition of A that corresponds to player o(r)’s
move-r information sets in Γk.W ea s s u m et h a tp l a y e r so b s e r v et h e i ro w np a y o ﬀsa t
the conclusion of play, which will require a consistency condition in our equilibrium
deﬁnition. Therefore, let Ck
i,t be the partition of A that corresponds to what player
i learns at the conclusion of play; e.g., this may equal the partition implied by vk
i ,
player i’s payoﬀ in Γk.
Given ˆ µi, the set of all events that i believes could be observed during play is
Ci ≡∪ Γk∈Λi ∪r∈{o−1(i),t} Ck
r. Ci is termed i’s set of consequences under ˆ µi.Note that
Ci ⊂ A and, since N may also contain a nature player, this formulation allows for the
inclusion of a rich set of environmental observables as well as partial-to-full knowlege
of competitor actions. It should also be pointed out that Γk ∈ Λi may be the extensive
form of a ﬁnitely repeated stage game. For each C ∈ Ci, there is a corresponding
set of feasible actions for player i, denoted AC (the deﬁnition of OΓ ensures measure
21consistency across games, so we suppress reference to the associated σ-algebras).
Thus, reaching an information set during play is equivalent to being told (C,A C).
To illustrate, suppose player II from the examples in Section 2 places positive
weight on ΓA (Figure 1) and ΓB (Figure 2); so, ΛII =
©
ΓA,ΓBª
. As we know,
ΓA,ΓB ∈ OΓ.P l a y e rII has one move. If the true game is ΓA, then at the time of
her move, she knows either CL ≡ {a1,a2,a3,a4} or CR ≡ {a5,a6,a7,a8} and that
s h ei st oc h o o s eo n eo f{u,d}. If, on the other hand, ΓB is the true underlying game,
her knowledge at the time of her move is completely unreﬁned; that is, she knows
C∅ ≡ A and that her feasible actions are {u,d}. Therefore, CA
II = {CL,CR} and
CB
II = {A}. Given her uncertainty, player II must develop an action plan that allows
for any of (CL,{u,d}),(CR,{u,d}),or (C∅,{u,d}).
A subjective behavior strategy for player i given µi is a function φi such that,
for all C ∈ Ci, φi (a|C) is the probability that a ∈ AC is played given i’s arrival at
the information set corresponding to C. It is easy to see that φi restricted to the
information sets of a particular game, e.g. Γk, corresponds to a unique behavior
strategy for i in that game, written φ
k
i ∈ Σk
i. Thus, given a game Γk, ap r o ﬁle of















∈ Σk. When referring explicitly to the
true game, Γ, we simply write mφ to refer to the actual measure on (A,A) induced
by φ.
For all Γk ∈ Λi, player i also makes an assessment, denoted b φk
−i, of the strategies








proﬁle summarizing i’s assessment of opponent behavior in each of these games. Given
a subjective behavior strategy φi and beliefs
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where Φi is the set of all subjective strategies for i (under ˆ µi). Let ˆ µ ≡ (ˆ µ1,...,ˆ µn)




denote proﬁles of player beliefs regarding the underlying game
and opponent behavior, respectively. Lastly, for the upcoming inﬂuence-consistency
condition, let ΞΓ denote the set of games that imitate Γ.
Deﬁnition 3 Ap r o ﬁle φ is a causal Nash equilibrium if there exist beliefs
³
ˆ µ, ˆ Θ
´
such that, for all i ∈ N : (1) Subjective optimization: φi ∈ BR
³
ˆ µi, ˆ Θi
´
;( 2 )U n c o n -




mφ-a.s.; and, (3) Learned structure: Λi ⊆ ΞΓ.
The ﬁrst condition says that players play best responses to their beliefs. The
second imposes consistency between a player’s expectations and the true distribution
induced on their own observables by φ. That is, a player’s expectations are correct
with respect to information sets arrived at with positive probability during the game.
Moreover, conditional expectations over own outcomes upon arriving at a particular
information set are also correct. The last requirement limits the set of games under
consideration to those that imitate Γ. The interpretation of this is that, as players
grope their way toward equilibrium during the (unmodelled) pre-equilibrium learning
phase, they discover the inﬂuence relationships implied by the structure of their game.
Finally, although a subjective strategy must provide for the possibility that player i












C), items (2) and (3) combined with the assumption of perfect recall
imply that this never occurs with positive probability in equilibrium.
Returning to the entry example, let φ be given by: (i) qE =0 ,a n d( ii) qI = 5
2 if
qE =0a n dqI = 2 otherwise. Assume the challenger’s beliefs about which game is
being played is given by µE < 1
2. Regarding the incumbent’s strategy, the challenger
23correctly believes the incumbent produces 5
2 when there is no entry and 2 otherwise.
The incumbent knows the game and assumes the challenger produces 2 if it enters.
Equilibrium payoﬀs are as expected. These strategies and beliefs constitute a causal
Nash equilibrium.
CNE places no explicit restrictions on players’ beliefs about the rationality or
payoﬀs of their opponents. Of course, (ˆ µi, ˆ Θi) may explicitly include such additional
restrictions. For example, a self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE) in Γ is a CNE such
that, for all i ∈ N, ˆ µi (Γ)=1 . So, SCEΓ ⊆ CNEΓ where SCEΓ is the set of self-
conﬁrming equilibria associated with Γ, etc. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is an SCE
such that, for all i ∈ N, ˆ Θi = φ−i. Therefore, NEΓ ⊆ SCEΓ. AB a y e s i a nN a s h
equilibrium (BNE) is an SCE in which, for all i,j ∈ N, ˆ µi =ˆ µj and ˆ Θi = φ−i. So,
BNEΓ ⊆ SCEΓ. Summing up:
Proposition 5 For any ﬁnite-length extensive-form game Γ, NEΓ ⊆ SCEΓ ⊆ CNEΓ
and BNEΓ ⊆ CNEΓ.
Kalai and Lehrer (1995), hereafter KL, present the notion of a “subjective game”
and a corresponding deﬁnition of subjective Nash equilibrium (SNE). In this formu-
lation, each player chooses a best response to his “environment response function,” a
mapping from his available actions to probability distributions on the consequences
he experiences as a result of those actions. We wish to show that CNE is a reﬁnement
of SNE. In order to make the comparison formal we must introduce some new con-
cepts and the corresponding notation. As in KL, we now restrict attention to games
with countable action sets11.
From player i’s perspective, upon reaching the information set corresponding
to C ∈ Ci, player i chooses some action aC ∈ AC and then, depending upon the
true game and the true strategies of his opponents, observes some new consequence
C0 ∈ Ci, and so on until the conclusion of play. This process can be summarized
by an environment response function for player i, a device that summarizes his indi-
vidual decision problem. Formally, for a given game Γ and opponent strategies φ−i,
24ei|C,aC(C0) denotes the true probability of player i observing consequence C0 given his
current information C and his play of action aC. The computation of i’s environment
response function is straightforward: for all C,C




where φi is any strategy that chooses aC with probability one conditional on reaching
C and does not make C impossible. If φ−i is such that C is impossible no matter what
strategy i chooses, then ei|C,aC can be deﬁned arbitrarily (since this situation never
comes up). Thus, ei summarizes all the stochastic information i needs to calculate
an optimal strategy.
Players may not know their true environment response function. Instead, player
i assesses ei by a subjective environment response function ˆ ei. That is, ˆ ei|C,a(C0)i s
i’s subjective assessment that C0 occurs after having been told C and having taken
action a ∈ AC. Then, mθi,ˆ ei represents i’s beliefs on observable events given his choice















where φi is any strategy that chooses aC with probability one conditional on reaching
C and that does not make C impossible.
The last piece of the analysis is to deﬁne expected payoﬀs and best responses given
φ−i. Since all games in Λi are of perfect recall, Ci can be partitioned into subsets
ordered by the period in which their elements are observed by i. Suppose i moves k
times in the true game Γ. Then, under the assumption that Λi ⊂ OΓ,imoves k times
in every game contained in Λi. Let Ci,0,Ci,1,...,Ci,t−1,Ci,t be the sets that partition Ci
in this fashion. So, Ci,r is the set of consequences i thinks could be reported at the
start of his rth turn. Then, the probability measure on Ci implied by φi and ei given

























Given an ei, the best-response correspondence is
BR(ei) ≡ {φi ∈ Φi |∀φ
0
i ∈ Φi,E v (φi|ei) ≥ Ev (φ
0
i|ei)}.
Using ˆ ei, we deﬁne mφi,ˆ ei,E v (φi|ˆ ei)a n dBR(ˆ ei) in the obvious way.
Deﬁnition 4 The pair (θ,ˆ e), ˆ e ≡ (ˆ e1,...,ˆ en),i sasubjective Nash equilibrium
(SNE) if, for all i ∈ N: (1) subjective optimization: φi ∈ BR(ˆ ei);a n d ,( 2 )u n c o n t r a -
dicted beliefs: for all B ∈ σ (Ci) mθi,ei (B)=mθi,ˆ ei (B).
Proposition 6 Given a game Γ with A countable, CNEΓ ⊆ SNEΓ.
The proof of this is almost immediate. Items (1) and (2) in Deﬁnition 4 are
implied by items (1) and (2) in Deﬁnition 3 (player’s payoﬀ information is included
in the description of the consequences in a subjective game). So, the only diﬀerence
is that CNE has the learned inﬂuence requirement, item (3), that is not imposed in
SNE.
5.3 Intervention games
We now turn to a class of games in which the distinctions of Deﬁnition 3 are mean-
ingful. Deﬁne an intervention game as one in which some player must choose an
appropriate intervention, meaning take an action that changes the feasible actions
available to some other player or players. Consider the following extended example
of such a game.
26A manager, denoted M, is responsible for the output of two departments, denoted
A and B.T h eﬁrm’s proﬁts, which the manager wishes to maximize, depend upon
coordination between the departments. The options available to M are: 1) pursue
a decentralized strategy and permit the two departments to engage in activities as
they see ﬁt, or 2) implement an intervention strategy to improve coordination by
setting departmental actions (e.g., by monitoring and policing that department’s
behavior). Assume, perhaps due to resource constraints, that M can only intervene
in the activities of one department or the other.
Referring to Figure 7, suppose the actual departmental subgame is Γ1 : A moves,
then B attempts to coordinate. We suppress payoﬀst oA and B and assume they












M = {L,R,l,r} (do nothing),
aL
M = {L,l,r} (make A play L),
aR
M = {R,l,r} (make A play R),
al
M = {L,R,l} (make B play l),
ar
M = {L,R,r} (make B play r),
2) A moves by choosing aA ∈ {L,R} ∩ aM, and 3) B moves by choosing aB ∈
{l,r} ∩ aM. M receives vM =1i fA and B coordinate (i.e., {L,l} or {R,r})a n d0
otherwise. Any choice other than the “do nothing” option by M is an intervention.
The idea is that M can either sit by and let the game run its natural course, or
(imperfectly) inﬂuence the joint behavior of A and B.
Suppose, however, that M does not know the structure of the interaction between
departments. For simplicity, assume that the departments play according to: A op-
erates independently with θA(L,R)=( .4,.6) and B attempts to coordinate with the
27following probabilities
A action θB (l,r|aA)
L (.8,.2)
R (.1,.9)
After a suﬃcient history of unmanaged departmental interaction, M observes the
following outcome frequencies
Empirical Distribution m





It is clear that A and B already do a reasonable job of coordinating. Left to their own
devices, coordinate 84% of the time. Thus, the expected payoﬀ of the decentralized
(do nothing) approach .84.
From the history of interaction described in the preceding table, it is clear that
either A or B plays a leadership role with the counterpart attempting to coordi-
nate (with mixed success). Clearly, the simultaneous-move subgame, Γ3, can be
ruled out. Γ1 and Γ2 on the other hand, are observationally indistinguishable. This
is easily seen since the respective IODs are {(M → A),(M → B),(B → A)} and
{(M → A),(M → B),(A → B)}, both of which conform to the conditions in Corol-
lary 2. Decomposing the empirical distribution into departmental strategies con-
sistent with Γ2, we have the following: B operates independently with θB (l,r)=




28Can M do better with an intervention? Since Γ3 can be ruled out, suppose
µM (Γ1)=µM (Γ2)=0 .5. Then, the expected payoﬀs associated with the available
interventions are:
Payoﬀ in Γi
Action Γ1 Γ2 Expected Payoﬀ
Do nothing .84 .84 .84
Fix L .80 .52 .66
Fix R .90 .48 .69
Fix l .40 .92 .66
Fix r .60 .75 .68
These beliefs and doing nothing constitute a CNE. Objectively, of course, M should
intervene and ﬁx aA = R, thereby increasing the expected payoﬀ f r o m. 8 4t o. 9 0 .
Thus, doing nothing is not a NE. Since positive weight is placed by M on Γ2, neither
is it a SCE.
Suppose µM (Γ3)=1w i t h˜ θA (L,R)=( .4,.6) and ˜ θB (l,r)=( .5,.5). The subjec-
tive expected intervention-contingent payoﬀsa r e
Do nothing .5
Fix aA = L .5
Fix aA = R .5
Fix aB = l .4
Fix aB = r .6
The subjectively rational manager sets aB = r, observes mθ (L)=( .4) and mθ (R)=
(.6) as expected and receives the expected payoﬀ of .6. This is an SNE, but not a
CNE since condition (3) of the CNE deﬁnition fails.
296 Discussion
Although our deﬁnition of observational imitation is new, the idea of observation-
ally indistinguishable strategies is introduced at least as early as Kuhn (1953). Two
strategies, behavior or mixed, are equivalent if they lead to the same probability
distribution over outcomes for all strategies of one’s opponents. Kuhn demonstrates
that, in games of perfect recall, every mixed strategy is equivalent to the unique be-
havior strategy it generates and each behavior strategy is equivalent to every mixed
strategy that generates it (see Aumann, 1964, for an extension to inﬁnite games). It
follows immediately that every extensive-form game of perfect recall is indistinguish-
able from its reduced normal form. Thus, any two games with the same reduced
normal form are indistinguishable.
We have interpreted the results in Section 4 as consistent with the inferences that
would be made by an outside observer with suﬃciently informative empirical data.
One question that immediately comes to mind is whether these ideas can be extended
to construct an econometric test for game structure given cross sectional data on
player actions. For example, the maximum likelihood estimate of the information
structure for an industry might be useful in reﬁning cost estimation in empirical
work in industrial organization (as suggested by the example in Section 5.1). This is
the subject of on-going research.
The literature contains two primary approaches to analyzing situations in which
players do not know the structure of their game. The ﬁrst, and closest to ours in
spirit, is Kalai and Lehrer’s (1993, 1995) work on subjective games and their notion of
subjective equilibrium. Kalai and Lehrer show that, provided beliefs are suﬃciently
close to the truth, play converges to a SNE. Moving to an inﬁnitely repeated version
of CNE and exploring the convergence properties of noisy learning processes strikes
us as a worthwhile extension of this paper; since CNE ⊆ SNE in ﬁnitely repeated
subjective games, we conjecture that results along the lines of Kalai and Lehrer also
hold in our setting. The second approach is to encode a player’s uncertainty regarding
30the information structure of the game into his or her type (` a la Harsanyi, 1967 — 68).
When players have correct (and, therefore, common) priors, there is nothing in our
methodology that is inconsistent with the Harsanyi approach.
Several authors have proposed other equilibrium deﬁnitions whose interpretations
are consistent with the idea that equilibria arise as the result of learning.12 The
structure shared by these deﬁnitions is: 1) players have prior beliefs about certain
unknowns (i.e., competitor strategies and/or various elements of game structure),
and 2) choose strategies that are best-replies to these beliefs, which then, 3) generate
observables that do not refute the priors upon which the strategy choices were based.
CNE has the novelty that beliefs are restricted to the set of imitative games rather
t h a n ,s a y ,t h es e to fg a m e sc a p a b l eo fi m i t a t i n gas p e c i ﬁc equilibrium strategy proﬁle
(typically, a much larger set). The stronger condition is appropriate, e.g., if players
observe a wide range of behavior prior to settling down into equilibrium.
A game’s IOD is a graph that summarizes information about its empirical dis-
tributions. This idea (i.e., using graphs to encode probabilistic information) is not
new outside economics. In particular, there is a burgeoning literature in artiﬁcial
intelligence on the use of graphs to simultaneously model causal hypotheses and to
encode the conditional independence relations implied by these hypotheses. Such
graphs are called probabilistic networks. An important distinction in our work is that
the IOD is derived from the primitives of a game and not from the properties of a
single, arbitrarily-speciﬁed probability distribution. Thus, the information encoded
in an IOD holds for all empirical distributions arising from play in the underlying
game. Moreover, many of the results in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rr e l yo nt h es p e c i a l
structure implied by distributions of this kind and, as mentioned earlier, may not hold
in a non-game-theoretic context (or, for example, if correlated strategies are allowed
without inclusion of a speciﬁc correlating device).
Until recently, work on probabilistic networks focused upon the decision problem
of a single individual. Thus, another aspect that separates our work from the existing
31literature in this ﬁeld is its use of these objects in the solution of game-theoretic (i.e.,
interactive) decision problems. Two other papers, one by Koller and Milch (2002)
and another by La Mura (2002) also use probabilistic networks to derive results of
interest to game theorists, though along a diﬀerent line. Both of these papers develop
alternative representations for interactive decision problems (i.e., as opposed to a
game’s strategic or normal form) and argue that these representations are not only
computationally advantageous but also provide qualitative insight into the structural
interdependencies between player decisions. Our work clearly complements this line
of research.
32A Dependency models
Here, we provide a condensed discussion of the relevant underlying theory of proba-
bilistic networks. Since most economists are unfamiliar with this literature, we wish
to: (i) give readers a sense of its theoretical content, and (ii)p r o v i d es u ﬃcient techni-
cal detail to support the development of our proofs. For those interested in pursuing
these ideas further, we suggest starting with the texts by Pearl (1988, 2000) and
Cowell et al. (1999).
Deﬁnition 5 A dependency model M over a ﬁnite set of elements T is a collection
of independence statements of the form (C ⊥ D|E) in which C,D and E are disjoint
subsets of T and which is read “C is independent of D given E.” The negation of an
independency is called a dependency.
The notion of a general dependency model was originated by Pearl and Paz (1985),
who were motivated to develop a set of axiomatic conditions on general dependency
models that would include probabilistic and graphical dependencies as special cases.
T h e s ea x i o m sa r ek n o w na st h egraphoid axioms.13 We are interested in graphoids,
which are deﬁned as dependency models that are closed under the graphoid axioms.
For example, given a probability space (A,A,µ) and an associated, ﬁnite set of
random variables X indexed by T = {1,...,t} with typical element ˜ xr,M µ is the
list of conditional independencies that hold under µ. For all W ⊆ T, let ˜ xW ≡
(˜ xr)r∈W. Then, for all disjoint C,D,E ⊂ T, (C ⊥ D|E) ∈ Mµ if and only if ˜ xC is
µ-conditionally independent of ˜ xD given ˜ xE. A proof that the graphoid axioms hold
for conditional independence in all probability distributions can be found in Spohn
(1980).
Alternatively, if G is a graph whose vertices are T, then for all disjoint C,D,E ⊂ T,
(C ⊥ D|E) ∈ MG if and only if E is a cutset separating C from D. Of course, in
this case, the meaning of (C ⊥ D|E) depends upon how one deﬁnes “cutset.” The
literature on probabilistic networks contains several such deﬁnitions, depending upon
33whether the graph is undirected, directed or some mixture of the two (i.e., a chain
graph). Since our IODs are directed, acyclic graphs (hereafter, DAGs), we proceed
with Pearl’s (1986) notion of d-separation (the d stands for “directed”).
Given a DAG G ≡ (T,→), a path is an ordered set of nodes P ⊆ T such that,
for all αr,αr+1 ∈ P, either αr → αr+1 or αr ← αr+1.A n o d e αr ∈ P is called
head-to-head with respect to P if αr−1 → αr and αr ← αr+1 in P. A node that starts
or ends a path is not head-to-head. A path P ⊂ T is active by E ⊂ T if: (i)e v e r y
head-to-head node is in or has a descendant in E, and (ii)e v e r yo t h e rn o d ei nP is
outside E. Otherwise, P is said to be blocked by E.
Deﬁnition 6 If G =( T,→) is a DAG and C,D and E are disjoint subsets of T,
then E is said to d-separate C from D i fa n do n l yi ft h e r ee x i s t sn oa c t i v ep a t hb yE
between a node in C a n dan o d ei nD.
Examples of d-separation can be found in the Pearl references cited above. Thus,
given a DAG G we deﬁne MG such that (C ⊥ D|E) ∈ MG if and only if Ed -separates
C from D in G.
We wish to characterize the relationship between probabilistic and graphical de-
pendency models. This is done through the general notion of an independence map
(or, I-map).
Deﬁnition 7 An I-map of a dependency model M is any model M0 such that M0 ⊆
M.
Given a probability space (A,A,µ) and an associated, ﬁnite set of random vari-
ables X ≡ {˜ x1,..., ˜ xt}, the task of constructing a DAG (T,→),T= {1,...,t},s u c h
that M(T,→) is an I-map of Mµ is straightforward (see Geiger et al., 1990, p. 514).
First, for all r ∈ T, let Ur ≡ {1,...,r − 1} index the predecessors of ˜ xr according to
T. Next, identify a minimal set of predecessors Πr ⊂ T such that ({r} ⊥ Ur\Πr|Πr)µ
where the “µ” subscript indicates probabilistic independence under µ. This results
34in a set of t independence statements known as a recursive basis drawn from Mµ
and denoted Bµ. Now, construct (T,→) such that s → r if and only if s ∈ Πr.T h e
resulting graph G, aD A G ,i ss a i dt ob e generated by Bµ and Πr = {s ∈ T|s → r} is
the set of parents of r in G.
The following theorems are from Geiger et al. (1990, Theorems 1 and 2). First,
an independence statement (C ⊥ D|E) is a semantic consequence (with respect to a
class of dependency models M — e.g., those that satisfy the graphoid axioms) of a set
B of such statements if (C ⊥ D|E) holds in every dependency model that satisﬁes
B; i.e., (C ⊥ D|E) ∈ M for all M such that B ⊆ M ∈ M.
Theorem 1 (soundness) If M is a graphoid and B is any recursive basis drawn
from M, then the DAG generated by B is an I-map of M.
So, given (A,A,µ), the DAG G constructed in the fashion outlined above is an
I-map of Mµ. That is, every independence statement implied by (T,→)u n d e rd
-separation corresponds to a valid µ-conditional independency.
Theorem 2 (closure) Let D be a DAG generated by a recursive basis B. Then MD,
the dependency model generated by D, is exactly the closure of B under the graphoid
axioms.
Following Pearl (2000, pp. 16-20), two DAGs (T,→)a n d( T,→0) are said to
be observationally equivalent if every probability distribution that can be factored
in accordance with the recursive basis B(T,→) ≡ {({r} ⊥ Ur\Πr|Πr)|r ∈ T} can also
be factored in accordance with B(T,→0) ≡ {({r} ⊥ U0
r\Π0
r|Π0
r)|r ∈ T}. The following
theorem is from Pearl (2000, Theorem 1.2.8). It originally appears in Verma and
Pearl (1990,Theorem 1) and is generalized by Andersson et al. (1997, Theorems B.1
and 2.1).
Theorem 3 Two DAGs (T,→) and (T,→0) are observationally equivalent if and
only if E = E0 and S = S0.
35BP r o o f s
B.1 Preliminary results
We begin with four lemmas that are used later. Given a game Γ and its IOD
G ≡ (T,→). Deﬁne BΓ ≡ {({r} ⊥ Ur\Πr|Πr)|r ∈ T} to be the collection of t in-
dependence statements associated with the moves in the game. Let MΓ be the clo-
sure of BΓ under the graphoid axioms. Notice that BΓ is a recursive basis drawn
from MΓ and, by construction of BΓ, G is the DAG generated by BΓ. Hence, by the
soundness theorem, G is an I-map of MΓ and by the closure theorem, MG = MΓ.B y
Proposition 1, for all θ ∈ Σ, the conditional independencies in BΓ hold in mθ. Thus,
the independence statements in MΓ hold in mθ for all θ ∈ Σ; i.e., for all θ ∈ Σ,
MΓ ⊆ Mmθ.
Lemma 2 Given an exact information game Γ and a probability distribution µ that
can be factored according to BΓ, there exists a strategy θ ∈ Σ such that mθ = µ,
µ-a.s.
Proof. By the premise, µ can be factored according to BΓ, so that for all r ∈ T,











≡ µ(Fr|˜ πr). Because Γ is a game of exact infor-
mation, σ (˜ πr)=Ir. Thus, the resulting proﬁle, (θr)r∈T, is a strategy proﬁle of Γ and
mθ = µ, µ-a.s., by construction.
Lemma 3 If Γ and Γ0, Γ ∈ OΓ0, are games of exact information and Γ ∈ rem(T0,→0)
then Γ ¹ Γ0. (Recall the deﬁnition of rem(T,→) in section 4.3.)
Proof. First, imitation is a transitive (see proof of Lemma 1 below): i.e., for
any games Γ1,Γ2 and Γ3, if Γ1 ¹ Γ2 and Γ2 ¹ Γ3, then Γ1 ¹ Γ3. Let EΓ1 ≡
36{(a,b)|a → b ∈ (T,→1)} denote the set of edges in (T,→1). Deﬁne
EΓ2−Γ1 ≡ {(a,b) ∈ T × T|(a,b) ∈ EΓ2,(a,b) / ∈ EΓ1};
i.e., the set of edges that are in (T,→2) but not in (T,→1).
We now continue with the proof in steps:
1 .D e l e t eo n ee d g ef r o mΓ0. Let Γ1 ∈ OΓ0 be a game of exact information such
that EΓ1 ⊂ EΓ0 and EΓ0−Γ1 = {(a,b)} where (a,b) ∈ EΓ0−Γ.A sb o t hΓ0 and Γ1





b \{ a}.L e t θ


















b \{ a}, σ(˜ π1
b) ⊆ σ(˜ π0
b). Thus, mθ1(˜ ab|˜ π1
b)=mθ(˜ ab|˜ π0
b). Hence,
condition (6) holds. By Proposition 2, Γ1 ¹ Γ0.I fEΓ0−Γ = {(a,b)}, go to step
4. Otherwise, let n =2 .
2. If EΓ0−Γ 6= EΓ0−Γn−1, we proceed by deleting an additional edge. Let Γn ∈ OΓ0
(and hence Γn ∈ OΓn−1) be a game of exact information such that EΓn ⊂ EΓn−1
and EΓn−1−Γn = {(c,d)} where (c,d) ∈ EΓ0−Γ. By the same argument as in step
1, Γn ¹ Γn−1. As, from the previous step, Γn−1 ¹ Γ0, by the transitivity of ¹
(see proof of Lemma 1 below), so that Γn ¹ Γ0.I fEΓ0−Γ = EΓ0−Γn go to step 4.
3. Otherwise, repeat step 2, increasing the value of n by one. Eventually, as the
set E0 is ﬁnite and E ⊂ E0, we will ﬁnd an n such that EΓ0−Γ = EΓ0−Γn.
4. Since Γ is a game of exact information, it has the same players, action spaces
and information sets as Γn so that Σ = Σn,h e n c eΓ ¹ Γ0.
37Lemma 4 Let (T,→) be an IOD for some game Γ. If r,s ∈ T such that r<sand




where ˜ hs\r (a) ≡ (a1,...,ar−1,a r+1,...,as−1).
Proof.
1. Let F0∈Is be an arbitrary element of the partition of A that generates Is.








, Gr ∈ σ (˜ ar),
Gr+ ∈ σ (˜ ar+1,...,˜ as−1).
2. Let Hr+1 ≡
n
(hr,a r) ∈ ˜ hr+1 (A)|hr ∈ ˜ hr (A),a r ∈ Ar
o
. By the deﬁnition of
an IOD, given r,s ∈ T, r<s ,if r 9 s, then for all (hr,a r),(hr,a 0
r) ∈ Hr+1
we have that for all F ∈Is such that ˜ h
−1
r+1 (hr,a r) ⊂ F,˜ h
−1
r+1 (hr,a 0
r) ⊂ F. Thus,
for all hr ∈ ˜ hr (A), there exist Gr+ ∈ σ (˜ ar+1,...,˜ as−1)a n dF ∈Is such that
˜ h−1
r (hr) ∩ ˜ a−1
r (˜ cr (hr)) ∩ Gr+⊂ F. But, the tree structure of the game implies
˜ a−1
r (˜ cr (hr)) = ˜ h−1
r (hr).





and Gr+ ∈ σ (˜ ar+1,...,˜ as−1)s u c ht h a t
F
0 = ˜ h
−1
r (Gr) ∩ ˜ a
−1
r (˜ cr (Gr)) ∩ Gr+
= ˜ h
−1
r (Gr) ∩ Gr+.









Lemma 5 Every inﬂuence opportunity diagram is a DAG.
Proof. This follows by construction: the graph is deﬁned using only directed
edges. It is acyclic because nodes are fully ranked by the order of play and directed
edges only appear from earlier moves to strictly later moves.
Finally, the following proposition implies a straightforward procedure for testing
whether Γ ¹ Γ0 where Γ is an arbitrary game and Γ0 is a game of exact information:
(i) construct the IODs for each game; then, (ii)c h e c k( u s i n gd-separation) to see
38whether the t independence statements in BΓ0 hold in (T,→). While this result
is more general than Proposition 4, it requires an understanding of the material
presented in Appendix A and may be quite cumbersome to implement in games with
many moves.
Proposition 7 Given two games Γ and Γ0, the latter a game of exact information,
if Γ0 ∈ OΓ and BΓ0 ⊆ MΓ, then Γ ¹ Γ0.
Proof. As discussed above, for all θ ∈ Σ, MΓ ⊆ Mmθ. By the premise, BΓ0 ⊆ MΓ.
It follows that, for all θ ∈ Σ, mθ c a nb ef a c t o r e di na c c o r d a n c ew i t hBΓ0; i.e., as in
condition (6). By Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, Γ ¹ Γ0.
B.2 Lemma 1
1. (Equivalence relation) Reﬂexivity: Given Γ and the identity mappings f (r)=r
and g (θ)=θ implies Γ ¹ Γ. Transitivity: Assume Γ ∼ ˆ Γ and ˆ Γ ∼ Γ0.
Suppose Γ ¹ ˆ Γ with permutation f and strategy mapping g,a n dˆ Γ ¹ Γ0 with
permutation ˆ f and mapping ˆ g.T h e n ,Γ ¹ Γ0 under ˜ f ≡ f ◦ ˆ f.a n d˜ g ≡ g ◦ ˆ g.
By similar reasoning, Γ0 ¹ Γ. Therefore, Γ ∼ Γ0. Symmetry: This is immediate
from the deﬁnition.
2. ((f (A0),f(A0))=(A,A)) This is immediate from Γ ∈ OΓ0.
3. Let g and ˆ g be functions meeting the conditions of Γ ¹ ˆ Γ and ˆ Γ ¹ Γ, respectively.
Deﬁne ˜ g : Σ ⇒ ˆ Γ as follows:





















. Then, for all ˆ θ ∈ˆ g−1 (θ),
³




ˆ A, b A, ˆ mθ
´
by the deﬁnition
of ˆ g. By the equality of measurable spaces (Part II), it is also the case that
(A,A,m ˆ θ)=( A,A,m θ).
39B.3 Proposition 1
Given equation (3), equation (4) holds if, for all θ ∈ Σ,r∈ T,
mθ (˜ ar|˜ πr)=mθ (˜ ar|Ir). (7)
Recall, for all F ∈ A,m θ (˜ ar (F)|˜ πr) is the conditional probability of ˜ a−1
r (Fr)g i v e n
σ (˜ πr). Thus, the two conditions characterizing mθ (˜ ar|˜ πr)a r e :( i) mθ (˜ ar|˜ πr)i sσ (˜ πr)-
measurable and (ii) for all F ∈ A, G ∈ σ(˜ πr),
Z
G




r (Fr) ∩ G
¢
.
We need to demonstrate that mθ (˜ ar|Ir) also satisﬁes these conditions. For all r ∈ T,
Lemma 4 implies that F ∈ Ir ⇒ F ∈ σ(˜ ak)k∈{s∈T|s9r}c.O fc o u r s e ,σ(˜ ak)k∈{s∈T|s9r}c =
σ (˜ πr), so Ir ⊂ σ(˜ πr). Therefore, mθ (˜ ar|Ir)i sσ(˜ πr)-measurable. But this (and the
deﬁnition of conditional probability) implies that, for all F ∈ A, G ∈ σ (˜ πr),
Z
G








The necessity of (6) follows from Corollary 1. To prove suﬃciency, consider an ar-
bitrary θ ∈ Σ. By the premise of the proposition, mθ can be factored according to
B(T,→0).S i n c eΓ0 is a game of exact information, by Lemma 2, there exists a θ
0 ∈ Σ0
such that mθ = mθ0. Therefore, Γ ¹ Γ0.
B.5 Proposition 3
By Theorem 3, (T,→)a n d( T,→0) are observationally equivalent. Hence, for all
θ ∈ Σ,m θ can be factored in accordance with B(T,→0). By Proposition 2, Γ ¹ Γ0. By
identical reasoning, if Γ is also a game of exact information, Γ0 ¹ Γ and, thus, Γ ∼ Γ0.
40B.6 Proposition 4
Suppose Γ is not of exact information. Let Γ1 b et h es a m eg a m ea sΓ in all respects
except that Γ1 is of exact information. As both Γ and Γ1 admit (T,→) condition
(6) holds so that by Proposition 2, Γ ¹ Γ1.L e t Γ∗, Γ∗ ∈ OΓ0,b eag a m eo fe x a c t
information with IOD (T,→∗). Per Corollary 2, Γ∗ ∼ Γ0. P e rL e m m a3a b o v e
Γ1 ¹ Γ∗. By the transitivity of imitation and indistinguishability (see proof of Lemma
1) Γ ¹ Γ1 ¹ Γ∗ ∼ Γ.
41CF o o t n o t e s
1. Many real-world managerial situations, for example, appear to be characterized
by this structure.
2. If our results are to be interpreted as relevant to situations in which players
learn about their ability to inﬂuence others, it seems reasonable to assume that
they do so in an environment in which such inﬂuence is a stationary aspect of
the game.
3. These conditions are less restrictive than they may at ﬁrst appear since players
may make multiple moves and/or may be limited to a single, ‘null’ action at
certain information sets (see, e.g., Elmes and Reny, 1994).
4. That is, they are ﬁnite, denumerable or isomorphic with the unit interval. In
particular, this assumption implies the points in each set are measurable. The
use of this word is due to Mackey (1957).
5. Both (1) and (2) follow from a standard result in probability theory. See, e.g.,
Fristedt and Gray (1997, p. 430-31).
6. Note that N h a ss o m eh o p eo fi n ﬂuencing II indirectly through I.E v e ns o ,II
may choose to ignore the move of I (e.g., pick u at both information sets).
7. In what follows, keep in mind the distinction between probability measures
on (A,A) induced by a strategy proﬁle in the underlying game versus generic
elements of the much larger space ∆(A,A). Our results are critically dependent
upon the structure implied by the former. In particular, correlated strategies are
not allowed without explicit correlating devices. The perfect recall assumption
implies that a player’s own behavior at diﬀerent moves may be correlated.
8. To illustrate the notational convention take the Games ΓA and ΓB in Figures
1a n d2 .T h e i rI O D sa r eN → I → II and II → I → N respectively. Strictly
42according to the deﬁnition, both IODs are 1 → 2 → 3. Using ΓA as the
reference point, the relevant permutation is f(1) = 3, f(2) = 2 and f(3) = 1 so
that oB(f(1)) = oA(1) = N, oB(f(2)) = oA(2) = I,a n doB(f(3)) = oA(3) = II.
Under our notational convention, the IOD for ΓB is 3 →B 2 →B 1, which
matches the intuitive description used in the discussion of the example: II →
I → N.
9. Note that feasible action consistency is implied by Γ0 ∈OΓ.
10. This last result raised a question that was put to us by E. Dekel in correspon-
dence. Given the well-known work by Thompson (1952) and Elmes and Reny
(1994) that identify transformations on extensive form games that yield the
equivalence class of games with the same strategic form, is there a set of oper-
ations, similar to these in spirit, that yield games with equivalent IODs (in the
sense of Corollary 2)? Due to space limitations, we do not provide a formal re-
ply. Clearly, however, Corollary 2 does suggest a step-wise transformation that
will yield observationally indistinguishable extensive forms with diﬀerent IODs.
The transformation, while diﬃcult to formalize in the context of an extensive
form game, is easy to describe: it is the transformation that ﬂips an “allowed”
arrow (per Corollary 2) in the original IOD.
11. Although KL allow for a more general set of possible consequences, we restrict
attention to those deﬁned above, Ci
12. A few of the more important contributions include Battigalli and Guatoli’s
(1988) conjectural equilibrium, Fudenberg and Levine’s (1993) self-conﬁrming
equilibrium and, of course, Kalai and Lehrer’s (1993, 1995) subjective equilib-
rium. For related work, see Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), Blume and
Easley (1992), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Geanakoplos (1994), Milgrom
and Roberts (1990), and Nachbar (1997). Howitt and McAfee (1992) employ a
similar idea in a macroeconomic application.
4313. The graphoid axioms are (Geiger et al. (1990) p. 515):
1. Symmetry (C ⊥ D|E) ⇒ (D ⊥ C|E)
2. Decomposition (C ⊥ D ∪ F|E) ⇒ (C ⊥ D|E)
3. Weak union (C ⊥ D ∪ F|E) ⇒ (C ⊥ D|E ∪ F)
4. Contraction (C ⊥ D|E) ∧ (C ⊥ F|E ∪ D) ⇒ (C ⊥ D ∪ F|E)
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Figure 5: illustration of IOD condition (4).
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Figure 7: possible departmental subgames.